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Abstract—authenticating users with the help of their
friends has been shown to be a promising backup
authentication mechanism. A user in this system is
associated with a few trustees that were selected from
the user’s friends. When the user wants to regain access
to the account, the service provider sends different
verification codes to user’s trustees. The user must
obtain at least k reset his or her password. In this paper,
we provide the first systematic study about the security
of trustee based social authentications. In particular, we
first introduce verification codes from the trustees
before being directed to small framework of attacks,
which attacks. In these attacks, an attacker initially
obtains we call forest fire iteratively, attacks the rest of
users by exploiting trustee-based social authentications.
Then, we construct a probabilistic model to for
attackers. Moreover, we introduce number of
compromised users, and then the attacker a novel
various defense formalize the threats of forest fire
attacks and their costs strategies. Evaluate various
concrete attack and defense our results have finally, we
apply our framework to strategies using three real world
social network datasets. Extensively strong implications
for the design of more secure trustee-based social
authentications.
Key words: Security model, backup authentication, social
networks
I. Introduction
Web services today most commonly rely on passwords to
authenticate users. Unfortunately, two serious issues in this
paradigm are: users will inevitably forget their passwords,
and their passwords could be compromised and changed by
attackers, which result in the failures to access their own
accounts. Therefore, web services often provide users with
backup authentication mechanisms to help users regain
access to their accounts. Unfortunately, current widely used
backup authentication mechanisms such as security
questions and alternate email addresses are insecure or
unreliable or both. Previous works have shown that security
questions are easily guessable and security questions. A
previously registered alternate email address might expire
upon the user’s change of school phished and those users
might forget their answers to the or job. For the above
reasons, it is important to design a secure and reliable
backup authentication mechanism. Recently, trustee-based
social authentication has attracted increasing attentions and
has been shown to be a promising backup authentication
mechanism and. Brainard et al. first proposed trustee-based
social authentication and combined it with other
authenticators (e.g., password, security token) as a two-
factor authentication mechanism. Later, trustee-based social
authentication was adapted to be a backup authenticator. In
particular, Schechter et al. [24] designed and built a
prototype of trusted based social authentication system
which was integrated into. found. However, these previous
work either focus on security at individual levels or totally
ignore security. In fact, security of users is correlated in
trustee-based social authentications, in contrast to traditional
authenticators where security of users are independent.
Specifically, a user’s security in trustee-based social
authentications relies on the security of his or her trustees; if
all trustees of a user are already compromised, then the
attacker can also compromise him or her because the
attacker can easily obtain the verification codes from the
compromised trustees. The impact of this key difference has
not been touched.
II. Background
The Trustee Based Social Authentication
A trustee-based social authentication includes two phases,
registration phase and recovery phase.
1) Registration Phase: The system prepares trustees for a
user Alice in this phase. Specifically, Alice is first
authenticated with her main authenticator friends, who also
have accounts in the system, are selected by either Alice
herself or the service provider from friend list and are
appointed trustees.
2) Recovery Phase: When Alice forgets her password or
her password was compromised and changed by an attacker,
she recovers her account with the help of her trustees in this
phase. Specifically, Alice first sends an account recovery
request with her, her trustees authenticate themselves into
the system and retrieve verification codes using the given
URL. Alice then obtains the verification codes from her
trustees via emailing them, calling them, or meeting them in
person. If Alice obtains a sufficient provider, then Alice is
authenticated and is directed to reset her password. We call
the number of verification. Note that it is important for
Alice to know who her trustees are in the Recovery Phase.
Schechter showed that users cannot remember their trustees
via performing user studies. Thus, a usable trustee-based
social authentication system should remind Alice of her
trustees. Next, we provide details about two representative
trustees based social authentication systems which were
implemented by Microsoft his or and Facebook,
respectively. In the Registration Phase of Trusted Contacts,
a user selects three to five friends from her friend list as
trustees. The recovery threshold is also set to be three.
Facebook does not remind a user of his or her trustees
International Journal of Science Engineering and Advance Technology,IJSEAT, Vol. 3, Issue 12 ISSN 2321-6905December-2015
www.ijseat.com Page 1375
instead. However, once the user gets one trustee correctly,
Facebook will remind him of his or her trustees, but it asks




We assume that attackers know the trustee network in the
target service. The reasonableness of this threat model is
supported by two evidences. First, attackers can obtain
users‟ usernames. A username is usually a string of letters,
digits, and special characters. Moreover, Bonneau et al. [3]
showed that a majority (e.g., 96% in their studies) of
websites enable attackers to probe if a string is a legitimate
username. Thus, strong attackers, who have enough
resources to perform username probing, can obtain all
usernames in the target service. Second, Schechter found,
via performing user studies, that users cannot remember
their own trustees. Therefore, a usable trustee-based social
authentication system must remind users of their trustees.
Recall that an account recovery request only requires a
username. As a result, an attacker could send account
recovery requests with the collected usernames to the
service provider which reminds the attacker of the trustees
of each user. Next, we take Facebook as an example to show
how an attacker obtains the trustee network. First, Facebook
provides an interface1 to test if a user is in Facebook. Thus,
the attacker can perform username to collect Facebook
users. Second, the attacker sends account recovery requests
to Facebook using the collected names. Recall that
Facebook shows all trustees to a user once the Facebook
users. Thus, the attacker can repeatedly guess the trustees of
a user until success. We note that Facebook only allows a
user to try around 10 times for typing in the trustees within a
short period of time. However, such rate limit cannot
prevent a strong attacker from obtaining the trustee network
eventually, though it can increase the attackers cost.
B. Forest Fire Attacks
1)Ignition Phase:In this phase, an attacker obtains a small
number of compromised users which we call seed users.
They could be obtained from phishing attacks, statistical
guessing, and password database leaks, or they could be a
coalition of users who collude each other. Indeed, a large
number of social network accounts were reported to be
compromised, showing the feasibility of obtaining
compromised seed users.
2) Propagation Phase: Given the seed users, the attacker
iteratively attacks other users. In each attack iteration, the
attacker performs one attack trial to each of the
uncompromised users according to some attack ordering of
them. In an attack trial to a user u, the attacker sends an
account recovery request with us username to the service
provider, which issues different verification codes to us
trustees. The goal of the attacker is to obtain verification
codes from at least k trustees. If at least k trustees of u are
already compromised, the attacker can easily compromise u;
otherwise, the attacker can impersonate u and send a
spoofing message to each uncompromised trustee of u to
request the verification code. Schechter et al. [24] found that
such spoofing attacks can successfully retrieve a verification
code with an average probability around 0.05. Although the
spoofing attacks can help attackers compromise more users,
we want to stress that they are optional.
3) Compromised Users could be Recovered: Users could
recover their compromised accounts to be uncompromised
after them or the service provider detects suspicious
activities of the accounts. For instance, a trustee of u
receiving a spoofing message might report to u, who then
changes his or her password; the phenomenon that a trustee
requests lots of verification codes for different users within
a short period of time is a possible indicator of forest fire
attacks, and the service provider could then notify the users,
whose trustees have requested verification codes, to change
passwords.
Fig. 1 Illustration of forest fire attacks
IV. Security Model
In this section, we introduce our security model to formalize
the threats of forest fire attacks and their costs for attackers.
1) Ignition Phase: If u is a seed user, then us initial
compromise probability is 1, otherwise we model us initial
compromise probability as 0. 2) Propagation Phase: The key
component is to update the aggregate compromise
probability of u when the aggregate compromise
probabilities of us trustees are given.
C. Obtaining One Verification Code
We denote by A the event that the attacker obtains a
verification code from a trustee v of u and the probability
that A happens in the attack iteration. Moreover, we denote
the event that v is already compromised when the attacker
attacks u in the attack iteration as B. When B does not
happen, the attacker can impersonate u and send a spoofing
message to request attacks succeed spoofing probability.
Spoofing probability might a verification code. We call the
probability that such spoofing probability might be different
in different attack iterations spoofing differently to spoofing
messages impersonating different users because be different
for different trustees. A trustee might behave he or she
might have different levels of trusts with the users that are
impersonated. Moreover, because trustees might gradually
become aware of the spoofing attacks.
D. Computing Compromise Probabilities
Recall that u is compromised if the attacker codes from at
least k trustees of u. Thus, given the natural assumption that
we trustees are independent, the compromise probability of
you can obtain verification in the attack iteration is
calculated.
E. Aggregating Compromise Probabilities
Assuming that whether u is compromised in one attack
iteration is independent with whether u is compromised in
attack iteration, we can iteratively compute the aggregate
compromise probability.
V. Attack Strategies
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The attacker could design the seed user selection strategy
and the attack ordering construction strategy to maximize
the expected number of compromised users. First, we show
that finding the optimal set of seed users and the optimal
ordering construction strategy is NP-Complete. Then, we
explore various scenarios where seed users have different
properties and introduce two ordering construction
strategies.
A. Strategies for Selecting Seed Users
A seed user’s selection strategy S is essentially to assign a
score which represents some metric of importance to each
user and to select ns users with the highest scores as seed
users. This is closely related to the node centrality problem
[18] in the network science community. In the following, we
modify a few node centrality heuristics as seed user’s
selection strategies. These strategies work on a trustee
network, and we name them with a prefix S to indicate they
are used to select seed users.
B. Mitigating spoofing Attacks
Another way to defend against forest fire attacks is to
remind trustees of not sharing verification codes via
messages. This strategy is not novel, and we include it for
completeness. Indeed, existing social authentication systems
[7], [24] already try to mitigate spoofing attacks. For
instance, Microsoft’s system [24] asks a trustee why she is
requesting the verification code and encourages her to share
the code with the user via phone or meeting in person.
C. Constraining Trustee Selections
Finally, we introduce strategies to constrain trustee
selections, which are easy to implement and effective at
defending against forest fire attacks. We consider both local
trustee selection strategies and global trustee selection
strategies. A local trustee selection strategy is based on a
user local social network structure while a global one is
based on the entire social network structure. We name these
strategies with a prefix „T-‟ to indicate that they are used to
select trustees. We note that how users select their trustees
in a real trustee-based social authentication system such as
Facebooks Trusteed Contacts is not clear and thus might not
be one of our strategies. However, our work focuses on a
comparative study about different trustee selection strategies
and can shed light on which strategy is more secure.
1) Local Trustee Selection Strategies
For a user u, a local trustee selection strategy essentially
computes a score for each friend v of u and then selects mu
friends with the highest scores as us trustees. T Random: As
a baseline, T the number of common friends of two users is
an informative indicator about the level of trust between
them. Thus, one speculation is that a user might select
friends with which he or she shares many common friends
as trustees. To quantify the security of this speculation, we
design the strategy which uses the number of common
friends shared by u and his or her friend v as the score s(v,
u), However, there are two drawbacks of T-CF. First, the
fact that u shares many friends with a popular user v does
not necessarily mean that u and v have a high level of trust
because it is normal for many friends of u to be in friend
list. Second, if a common friend of u and v is a popular user,
then sharing him or doesn’t necessarily indicate a high level
of trust between u and v. Next, we introduce two strategies
to overcome the two drawbacks, respectively.
2) Global Trustee Selection Strategies
Global strategies leverage the entire social network structure
and thus are potentially better than local strategies. As we
discussed, seed users could be those having large outdegrees
in the trustee network, and they could enable an attacker to
compromise many other users. Thus, we propose the T-
Degree strategy to minimize the maximum outdegree in the
trustee network. Intuitively, T-Degree constrains that no
users are selected as trustees by too many other users. T-
Degree selects trustees for users one by one. For each user u
that has adopted the trustee-based social authentication
service, T-Degree selects his or her mu friends whose
current outdegrees in the trustee network are the smallest as
yours trustees; ties are broken uniform at random.
VII. Experimental Results
A. Impact of Attacker’s Resources and Attack Orderings
The number of attack iterations is closely related to the costs
of sending spoofing messages.
Fig. 2 Impact of Attacker’s Resources and Attack Ordering
Figure 2 illustrates the expected number of compromised
users (Figure 2a) and the expected number of required
spoofing messages can perform forest fire attacks with low
costs. This is because such an attacker can send out billions
of messages per day with a low cost which is far more than
that needed to spoof trustees in our experiments. Second, we
find that the ordering construction strategy O-Gradient
compromises more users and requires fewer spoofing
messages than O-Random when the attacker performs a
given number of attack iterations. In other words, given the
number of spoofing messages the attacker can send, the
attacker should adopt O-Gradient to construct the attack
orderings.
B. Impact of Seed Users’ Selection Strategies and Trustee
Selection Strategies
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Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the expected number of
compromised users and the expected number of required
spoofing messages respectively for different seed selection
strategies and trustee selection strategies. We can draw a
few conclusions. First, we find that forest fire attack is a
potential big threat. For instance, when the seed users are
appointed as trustees of many in the three social networks,
respectively. This represents a growth of two to three orders
of magnitude from the 1,000 seed users. However, our
strategy T-Degree can decrease the expected number of
compromised users by one to two orders of magnitude. For
instance, the expected number of compromised users of T-
Degree is 53 times smaller than that o selection strategy is
S-Degree. Moreover, our strategy T-Degree can increase the
costs for attackers by a few times in some cases. For
instance, the cost of sending spoofing messages of T-Degree
is 3 times bigger than that of T-CF and that of T-AA on
reason is that the trustee networks constructed by T-Degree
are more loosely connected, which makes it harder for forest
fire attacks to propagate among them. Second, even if the
seed users are distributed among a social network uniformly
at random (i.e., S-Random), the attacker can still
compromise dozens of times more users. For instance, the
attacker can still compromise 65 to 80 times more users in
Twitter depending on how trustees are selected. Third, T-JC
works better than T-AA which performs better than T-CF
for all seed selection strategies except S-Random. We find
that the outdegree distributions of the trustee networks
constructed by T-CF are skewed towards high degrees the
most while those constructed by T-JC are skewed towards
low degrees the most. Thus, the seed users in the trustee
networks constructed by T-JC have lower outdegrees than
those constructed by T-AA, which have lower outdegrees
than those constructed by T-CF. As a result, T-JC performs
better than T-AA and T-AA performs better than T-CF.
Fig. 3 The expected number of compromised users for
different seed users selection strategies and trustee selection
strategies a) Flickr b) Google+ c) Twitter
Fig. 4 The ratio between the expected number of users that
are compromised without spoofing attacks and those with
spoofing attacks for different seed selection strategies and
trustee selection strategies
VIII. Conclusion And Future Works
We provide the first systematic study about the security of
trustee-based social authentications. First, we introduce
forest fire attacks. In these attacks, an attacker first obtains a
small number of compromised seed users and then
iteratively attacks the rest of users according to a priority
ordering of them. threats of forest fire attacks and their costs
for attackers. Third, Second, we construct a probabilistic
model to formalize the introduce a few strategies to select
seed users and construct priority orderings, and we discuss
various defense strategies. Of seed users, an attacker can
further compromise two to three orders of magnitude more
users in some scenarios with low costs of sending spoofing
messages. However, our defense strategy, which guarantees
that no users are trustees of too many other users, can
decrease the number of compromised users by one to two
orders of magnitude and increase the costs for attackers by a
few times in some cases. Moreover, the recovery threshold
should be set to be 4 to better balance between security and
usability. A few future directions include evaluating forest
firest attacks on real social authentication systems such as
Facebook‟s Trusted Contacts, designing new attack and
defense strategies, and optimizing forest fire attacks given a
time constraint.
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